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Shapo: Tort Reform: The Problem of the Missing Tsar

TORT REFORM: THE PROBLEM OF THE
MISSING TSAR
Marshall S. Shapo*
"Tort reform" has been the rage for a decade. Many articles
and books have been written on the topic. The subject will require
even more discussion in the context of a recognition of the place of
tort in a broader jurisprudence of injury.
This Commentary seeks to contribute to the discussion. It deals
briefly with a beguiling idea, focusing on analysis of institutions that
deal with injury, that has attracted adherents recently. There is a
special irony in the fact that this idea-which seems to embody notions of centralized direction of the social response to injuries- has
come to the fore as the system of the twentieth century Tsars appears, if with much pain and uncertainty, to be breaking down in
Eastern Europe. For the approach that I criticize here embodies the
Problem of the Missing Tsar.
In 1987, Richard Stewart wrote of the importance of an "institutional perspective" on tort-related law." He suggested that a "comparative institutional analysis" could "educate us about the decisional characteristics and tendencies" of the "different institutional
processes" 2 that bear on "personal injuries caused by business, professional and government enterprise activities."' Stewart's catalog of
these processes, apart from tort litigation, ranged from "contracts
and markets"4 through "no-fault liability and compensation sys-6
tems" 5 and included government regulation and loss insurance.
* Frederic P. Vose Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; A.B. University of Miami, 1958; A.M. Harvard University, 1961; LL.B University of Miami, 1964;
S.J.D. Harvard University, 1974.
1. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 184
(1987).
2. See id. at 196-97.
3. See id. at 184.
4. See id. at 190.
5. See id. at 191.
6. See id.
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Stewart also spoke of the possibility of a "radical[] restructur[ing]"
of the litigation system and of "a 'public law' model of tort
17
litigation."
By analyzing these different approaches to the problem of injuries caused by enterprises, Stewart sensibly suggested, one could secure important information, for example, about "the levels of compensation and the administrative cost-effectiveness of different
institutional systems." 8 With particular regard to "whether the tort
system should be modified and its jurisdiction altered," Stewart suggested that "[w]e must.., give due regard... [to its] comparative
performance in providing appropriate incentives, delivering cost-effective compensation, and imposing fit sanctions.""
A very recent article by Neil Komesar' ° makes explorations
along this line. Komesar has provided an important theoretical analysis of three institutions: tort, criminal law and administrative regulation, and the market, classified according to the potential and actual impacts of given injuries on victims and on injurers. 11 Carrying
forward the great tradition of institutional analysis associated with
the University of Wisconsin, Komesar suggested that application of
this framework "should help us to understand and rearrange the
boundaries between common, statutory, and administrative law, and
the boundaries between criminal, tort, and contract law.' 2 However,
according to Komesar, no one had "attempted to integrate consideration of the various roles and institutions in one framework."'11 Although Komesar credited Stewart with calling for "a comparative
institutional approach,' 4 he added that "to date, no one has
responded."1 5
In fact, I took a preliminary cut at that problem in 1984, analyzing at some length certain practical consequences of social choices
among different institutions. 16 For example, I noted various costs of
7. Id.
8. Id. at 197.
9. Id. at 198.
10. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990).
11. See generally id. at 27-50.
12. Id. at 76.
13. Id. at 25 n.8.
14. Id. at 25 n.8 (emphasis in original).
15.

Id.

16. See generally AMERICAN

BAR Ass'N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY Sys-

TEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984) [hereinafter TOWARDS A JURISPRU-
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compensation legislation that might render it inferior to tort law. 17 I
also described numerous problems associated with federal regulation
of product and process hazards that indicated that "as social legislation expands and contracts, and the polity's enthusiasm for regulation waxes and wanes . . . the law of torts sometimes provides a
welcome anchor."1 8
There is a major practical problem inherent in calls for institutional rearrangement, 19 which this Commentary identifies. Presenting here a wedge of my own work in progress on this set of issues, I
suggest that an answer to votaries of comprehensive restructuring is
especially apparent in this year of turmoil, which has brought such
striking, if at this writing, unpredictable changes in the Tsar-like autocratic system that supplanted the Tsars.
The problem is precisely one of Tsarlessness: The Problem of
the Missing Tsar. One may speak facilely of "assign[ing]" injury
law tasks to one "system" or the other 2 -- to tort, to compensation
legislation, to social insurance, to regulation. But that is not the way
our system works. Even taking into account the wastefulness of the
gaps and overlaps that afflict a relatively uncoordinated multi-system
approach to injuries, the American system has refused to adopt the
solution of the Tsar.
Stewart, apparently skeptical of the employment of tort at its
present levels, recognizes the probability that in practice "[w] e likely
will continue to rely on a combination of institutions.1 21 And
DENCE OF INJURY].

17. See id. at 10-45 to 10-58.
18. Id. at 10-190.
19. Cf. Stewart, supra note 1, at 199 (saying that "the recent advances of tort have
exposed weaknesses in the foundations that may presage large-scale institutional
restructuring.").
20. See id. at 186. The most recent expression of this idea appears in a series of drafts
for the American Law Institute's Project on Compensation and Liability for Process and Project Injuries. One may find an evocative, though significantly qualified, summary of the proposition in the latest rendition of the Project, as of this writing, in American Law Institute, I
Compensation and Liabilityfor Product andProcess Injuries (Proposed Final Report, Nov. 5,
1990). The drafters summarize the notion that instead of "using only one policy instrument-tort law-to serve multiple goals that are often conflicting ... we might employ a.
variety of devices, each tailored to the particular role that is parcelled out to it." Id. at 40-41.
They conclude, however, that experience with "alternatives to tort law" indicates that "it is
not clear that any of them performs appreciably better than the tort system." Id. at 41. Stewart himself had advised that "[w]e ...move cautiously before adopting entirely new systems
to replace tort law," saying that "[e]ven accepting the systematic view of the crisis, it is not
clear which of the suggested alternatives will best serve the functions--compensation, deterence, and condemnation- that are now assigned to the tort system." Id. at 185-86.
21. Stewart, supra note 1, at 198.
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Komesar, already having instructed us about certain strengths of the
tort system,22 expresses his skepticism "of what . . . passes for tort
23
reform.
Anyone who has written at length about the problems of tort
law and tried to fashion solutions for them24 is in debt to Stewart for
his critical overview and to Komesar for his particularized analysis
of institutional characteristics. They have usefully emphasized to us
the importance of acquiring and analyzing information about legal
institutions that deal with the injury problem. Yet as we pursue the
obstacle-strewn course of data collection,25 and strive for an injury
law that is both fairer and more efficient, 28 we would do well to keep
in mind the Problem of the Tsar and the advantages of Tsarlessness.
In our need for a womb of comprehensive solutions, we are all
probably drawn to the metaphor of the "tireless . . . administrator
with a file-cabinet mind, superior intelligence, and a computerized
grip on dangerous activity . . . sitting at a great control board at
which he adjusts risks twenty-four hours a day. '2 7 But in a politicolegal climate that changes from decade to decade, in a system where
there is no Tsar-no one to issue sumptuary edicts that assign so
much of the injury problem to the market, and so much to tort, to
compensation systems, and to regulation-tort has a special utility.
Ironically, for all the criticism of the allegedly wild expansionary
tendencies of tort and of its uncertainties, it provides an island of
relative certainty in our injury law: as an aid to the workings of the
market, as a powerful set of symbols for proper behavior, as a gyroscopic mechanism in changing political weather.
In seeking ways to improve the response of our law to injuries-as we should and must-we are well advised to number its advantages, in a tradition that John Marshall captured in his declara22.

See Komesar, supra note 10, at 60-70 (discussing punitive damages and joint and

several liability).
23.
24.
25.
System,

See id. at 76.
See, e.g., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra note 16, at 13-1 to 13-23.
The first recommendation of the A.B.A.'s Special Committee on the Tort Liability
in a chapter of its report devoted entirely to recommendations for improvement, was

for "the creation of a permanent organization for the comprehensive collection of data on
injuries and injury-causing events, and the ways in which individuals, communities, and the

legal system respond to the problems created by injuries." See id. at 13-1.
26. It would be well if legal educators and lawyers began to view the problem explicitly
as one of the jurisprudence of injury. See, e.g., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY, supra
note 16; M. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW (1990).
27. M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116 (1977)
(employing this image in a different context).
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tion in Marbury v. Madison2 8 that "[t] he very essence of civil liberty
claim the proteccertainly consists in the right of every individual to
' 29
injury.
an
receives
he
whenever
tion of the laws,
This declaration throws into relief the Problem of the Missing
Tsar. At once, it limns the practical benefits, as well as the constraints, of Tsarlessness.

28.
29.

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 163.
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